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COMMENT
One Person, No Vote: Staggered Elections,
Redistricting, and Disenfranchisement
Every ten years, California redraws the maps for its State Senate districts in
order to restore compliance with the constitutional "one person, one vote"
requirement Because state senatorial districts hold staggered elections,
redistricting allows some Californians to cast two votes for a state senator
within a four-year election cycle: once in their old senatorial district, and once
again, just two years later, in their new senatorial district. Meanwhile others do
not vote for a state senator at any point within the same four-year timeframe.
Redistricting therefore creates the exact harm it intends to prevent: in service
of the ideal of "one person, one vote," California gives some voters two votes
and others no vote at all. During the current cycle, an estimated 3.97 million
Californians will be temporarily disenfranchised on account of redistricting;'
another 3.9 million will be double-enfranchised.
The problem arises from the intersection of the ten-year redistricting cycle
with California's system of staggered State Senate elections. Every two years,
half of California's state senators stand for election, with odd-numbered
districts holding elections in presidential-election years and even-numbered
districts holding elections in midterm-election years. When redistricting moves
a voter from an odd district to an even district, that voter is placed in
democratic limbo: her old senator's term ends in 2012, but her new district
does not hold elections until 2014. Thus for two years, that voter is not
1. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, SS8 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381
(1963)).
2. Vandermost v. Bowen, No. S198387, 2012 WL 246627, at *31 (Cal. Jan. 27, 2012).
3. Jim Miller & Brian Joseph, Redistricting: New Lines Leave Some Voters Without a Senator,
PRESs-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 17, 2011, http://www.pe.com/local-news/politics/jim-miller
-headlines/20111217-redistricting-new-lines-leave-some-voters-without-a-senator.ece.
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represented by a senator for whom she had an opportunity to cast a ballot, a
status euphemistically termed "deferral." A voter moved from an even to an
odd district faces the opposite scenario: she can vote in her new district in 2012,
even though her old senator, whom she elected in 2010, will continue serving
through 2014. These "accelerated" voters thus cast ballots in races for two State
Senate seats, while most Californians only cast ballots for one senator, and
deferred voters cast ballots for none.
This problem is not unique to California: twenty-eight states elect one or
both houses of their legislature by staggered terms.4 Each of these states must
balance legislative continuity and state constitutional requirements with
democratic participation and federal equal protection principles in reconciling
staggered elections with decennial redistricting. This Comment identifies the
methods various states use to resolve this problem, and it argues that
California and states employing unmodified staggered elections ought to adopt
a system of truncated terms, whereby all State Senate districts hold elections in
the first election year following redistricting. Such a system would better fulfill
constitutional and democratic norms of equal participation and would be more
consistent with the policy preferences of California voters.
Part I describes California's system, variants in other states, and the
resulting inequality among voters. After Part II explores Florida's alternative
system of truncated terms, Part III argues that a Florida-style system is
preferable to California's because it is more consistent with constitutional and
democratic norms. Part IV examines the counterargument that continued
staggering serves the state's interest in institutional continuity and concludes
that other democratic values must take precedence.
1. HOLDOVERS, ACCELERATED TERMS, AND DEFERRED VOTERS: THE
CALIFORNIA SYSTEM
The California Constitution, adopted in 1879, requires that elections for
State Senate be staggered, with half of all senatorial districts holding elections
every two years.s In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled in Reynolds v. Sims that
states must ensure that legislative districts are roughly equal in population in
4. The following states stagger the terms of their legislatures' upper chambers only: Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. North
Dakota staggers terms in both houses; Nebraska's unicameral legislature is staggered. See
infra Appendix.
5. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 2, subsec. a.
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order to comply with the Equal Protection Clause.6 To comply with Reynolds,
California adopted a system of decennial redistricting; however, it has not
amended its constitution's system of staggered elections to alleviate the
resulting problem of deferred and accelerated voters described above. The
California Supreme Court endorsed this convoluted system in its 1973 decision
in Legislature v. Reinecke, reasoning that " [t]o obviate the inequality [between
voters] would substantially interfere with the orderly operation of the four-
year staggered terms system after every reapportionment."7  Thus, the
intersection of the nineteenth-century state constitution and the twentieth-
century redistricting mandate has generated a democratic dilemma: every ten
years voters may elect one, two, or zero state senators owing solely to the
vagaries of the redistricting process.
Californians reformed the state's redistricting process in the Voters First
Act of 2008, which established an independent redistricting commission and
required that new district lines be drawn without regard to the incumbent's
place of residence. Having separated many voters from their legacy districts,
the first Citizens Redistricting Commission considered the issue of deferral and
acceleration only after the district boundaries were drawn.9 In the current
electoral cycle, the Commission worked to minimize the number of deferred
(odd-to-even) voters by determining which districts had the greatest
proportion of formerly-odd voters and assigning those districts odd numbers."o
For those voters still deferred, this is little consolation: for the next two years,
they must be represented by a state senator they had no voice in electing, for
reasons completely outside of their control.
6. 377 U.S. 533.
7. 516 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1973).
8. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2, subsec. e.
9. Citizens Redistricting Commission's Narrative on Preliminary Final District Maps, CAL. CITIZENS
REDISTRICTING COMMISSION (July 29, 2011), http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/
meeting-handouts-0 7 2011/handouts 2010729_narrative.pdf; see also In re Full Commission
Business Meeting: Hearing Before the Cal. Citizens Redistricting Comm'n 132-88 (Cal. July 21,
2011), available at http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov/downloads/transcripts/2ollo7/
transcripts 20110721_sacto.pdf.
io. Citizens Redistricting Commission's Narrative on Preliminary Final District Maps, supra note 9.
This numbering plan itself is also potentially vulnerable to legal challenge, since it is unclear
whether it complies with the Voters First Act's requirement that districts be "numbered
consecutively commencing at the northern boundary of the State and ending at the southern
boundary." CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2, subsec. f. The Commission's plan results in many
discrepancies from north-south continuous numbering: e.g., district six is north of district
five and district twenty-five is north of district twenty-two. Maps: Final Certified Senate
Districts, CAL. CITIZENS REDISTRICTING COMM'N (Aug. 15, 2011), http://wedrawthelines.ca
.gov/maps-final-draft-senate-districts.html.
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California is not alone in its non-solution. Similarly, Oregon," Tennessee,1 2
Kentucky,' Indiana, 4 Missouri," Nevada,'" Oklahoma," Utah,'" Washington,"
West Virginia,2o and Wisconsin2 1 do not modify their existing staggered-
election system to account for the impact of decennial redistricting. Non-
modification is the rule in any state without an explicit constitutional provision
or state court decision changing the system of elections, since without explicit
legislative, judicial, or constitutional authorization to do otherwise, the
ordinary system of staggered elections required by statute or state constitution
continues to operate.
Other states reassign legislators whose terms continue past redistricting
(termed "holdover" legislators) to represent new districts. Nebraska,
Montana,' Oklahoma, Pennsylvania2' and Ohio2 7 reassign holdover legislators
ii. Republican Party of Oregon v. Keisling, 959 F.2d 144, 145-46 (9 th Cir. 1992).
12. Mader v. Crowell, 498 F. Supp. 226, 231 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
13. Anggelis v. Land, 371 S.W.2d 857, 858-59 (Ky. 1963); see also 1982 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 2-18
(Jan. 11, 1982). However, Kentucky's status has recently been thrown into question by
litigation pending at the time of writing. See infra note 28.
14. IND. CONST. art. IV, 5 3.
15. Mo. CONST. art. III, § 11.
16. NEV. CONST. art. XVII, § 9; State ex rel. Herr v. Laxalt, 441 P.2d 687, 691 (Nev. 1968).
17. OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 80.35.1 (2012).
18. UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-1-102 (LexisNexis 2011).
ig. Prince v. Kramer, No. CIV. NO. 9668, 1972 WL 123242 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 1972).
20. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
21. Wis. CONST. art. IV, S 5.
22. Whether Wyoming will maintain its staggered-election system will be decided by the state's
legislature. In response to a request for an advisory opinion, the state attorney general
concluded in late 2011 that, in redistricting, the legislature could chose to either allow all
sitting state senators to complete their current terms, following the ordinary system of
staggered elections (resulting in deferral), or truncate their terms, at the legislature's
discretion. Letter from Gregory A. Phillips, Att'y Gen. of Wyo., to Sen. Cale Case & Rep.
Peter S. Illoway, Formal Op. No. 2011-003, 2011 WL 5304071 (Oct. 10, 2011). At the time of
writing, legislation was pending that would generate deferral and acceleration. H.B. 0032,
61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2012).
23. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 7; see Carpenter v. State, 139 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Neb. 1966) (holding
that the two-year holdover period, being "reasonable, uniform, and impartial," is not an
"unconstitutional hindrance or impediment to the right of a qualified voter to exercise the
elective franchise" because of the "practical impossibility to redistrict without this effect");
see also Pick y. Nelson, 528 N.W.2d 309 (Neb. 1995).
24. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 3; Wheat v. Brown, 85 P-3 d 765, 771 (Mont. 2004); see also Letter
from Mike Greely, Att'y Gen. of Mont., to Sen. Stan Stephens, Op. No. 2, 40 Mont. Op.
Att'y Gen. 7 (Jan. 21, 1983).
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to represent a newly drawn district (generally, the new district with the largest
proportion of constituents from that legislator's old district or the new district
where the legislator resides). States without holdover reassignment leave
holdover legislators in their existing numbered seats, often even temporarily
waiving in-district residency requirements to allow legislators to represent
districts they no longer live in." Despite their variations, these California-style
systems still defer voters; many voters in these states see the terms of the
legislators they elected elapse and then must wait two years before electing a
new legislator." The numbers of voters affected are often uncounted, but can
be large: for example, in Pennsylvania 1.3 million voters were deferred
25. OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit., 14 § 80.35.1 (West 2012).
26. Pennsylvania assigns holdover senators based on where the senators live, such that each
senator is assigned to represent the newly drawn district that includes his or her residence.
25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 220 (West 2007); see also Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F. 3d 508, 516
(3d Cir. 1993). Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, "[a]ny district which does not include
the residence from which a member of the Senate was elected whether or not scheduled for
election at the next general election shall elect a Senator at such election." PA. CONST. art. II,
§ 17, subsec. f.
27. In Ohio, holdover senators represent, by constitutional mandate, the new district with the
largest population overlap with the old district that elected him or her. However, if under
this rule multiple senators would represent the same district, "the persons responsible for
apportionment . . . shall designate which senator shall represent the district and shall
designate which district the other senator or senators shall represent for the balance of their
term or terms." OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 12.
28. E.g., OR. CONST. art. IV, S 8, subsec. 7, para. b ("Following the applicable deadline for
making a final apportionment ... until the expiration of the term of office of the person, a
person may be an inhabitant of any district."); Anggelis v. Land, 371 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Ky.
1963) (acknowledging that in the interim "the persons who are represented by the Senator
from the Twelfth District are no longer the ones who elected him"); 4 2A CAL. JUR. 3d
Legislature § 7 (2008) ("A duly elected legislator who was qualified for office at the time of
his or her election is not deprived of office by a readjustment of districts resulting in the
legislator ceasing to be a resident of the district from which he or she was elected."); see also
People ex rel. Jennings v. Markham, 31 P. 102 (Cal. 1892); Letter from Steven L. Beshear,
Att'y Gen. of Ky., to Vic Hellard, Jr., Dir., Legislative Res. Comm'n, 1982 Ky. Op. Att'y
Gen. 2-18 (Jan. 11, 1982). This process has recently become the subject of controversy in
Kentucky, based on a Democratic Senator's claim of partisan misuse by the Republican-
dominated legislature. E.g., Jack Brammer, Stein Supporters Rally To Protest Redistricting of
Her State Senate Seat, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Jan. 23, 2012, http://www.kentucky
.com/2012/o1/23/2o3904/stein-supporters-rally-to-protest.html. At the time of writing,
Kentucky's system was called into question by pending litigation alleging partisan misuse.
See Fischer v. Grimes, No. 12-CI-109 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012), appeal docketed, Nos.
2012-SC-000091 & -000092 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 2012).
29. The democratic and legal problems with state constitutions and statutes assigning legislators
to purportedly elective office are beyond the scope of this Comment, but are clearly ripe for
further study.
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following the 1990 census; 3o in Kentucky just over 351,000 citizens may be
deferred after the 2010 census.
II. TRUNCATION, SPECIAL ELECTIONS, AND THE RESET BUTTON:
THE FLORIDA MODEL
In contrast, other states avoid deferring or accelerating voters by requiring
all districts to hold elections in the first cycle following redistricting. Statewide
senatorial elections "reset" the staggered election cycle, ensuring that all voters
are represented by a senator they had the opportunity to elect under the new
districting plan.
Florida, like California, conducts staggered senatorial elections." Unlike
California, however, Florida effectively requires that all districts hold elections
in the first general election following redistricting.3 Florida's constitution
requires all senators to be elected from the districts they represent, 4 and
explicitly allows some state senators to serve two-year -rather than four-year -
terms following redistricting.35 Based on the intersection of these provisions,
the Florida Supreme Court held that "senate terms [must] be truncated when a
geographic change in district lines results in a change in the district's
constituency."" To restore staggering, Florida returns to the normal election
schedule after the off-cycle post-redistricting statewide elections, in effect
causing odd- and even-numbered districts to alternate truncated terms every
ten years.
In this way, the Florida system restores symmetry: all senators are elected
by residents of their districts as currently drawn, and all voters have the
opportunity to vote for their current senator. Texas, 7 Illinois," Arkansas,39 and
3o. Donatelli, 2 F.3d at 511.
31. Fischer, No. 12-CI-109, slip. op. at 7.
32. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 15.
33. In re Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 414 So. 2d 1040,
1047-48 (Fla. 1982). Technically, if a particular district's boundaries are identical under the
old and new districting plans, that district is not required to hold an election unless its
senator's term is expiring. Id. at 1049.
34. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1.
3s. Id. § 15, subsec. a.
36. In re Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d at 1047-48. The Florida Supreme Court explicitly
rejected the parallel to Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6 (Cal. 1973), on the grounds that the
truncation clause of the Florida Constitution distinguished the two situations. In re
Apportionment Law, 414 So. 2d at 1047.
37. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 3.
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Iowa4o all employ similar systems, although they restore staggering by drawing
lots to allocate short and long terms. These systems represent a solution to the
California scheme's problems: they produce no deferred or accelerated voters.
Yet they also make tradeoffs. By truncating some senators' terms once every
ten years, the Florida system incurs costly statewide elections, while disrupting
the continuity benefits of a staggered system of elections. However, as Parts III
and IV will argue, the democratic and constitutional benefits outweigh the
costs.
III. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, ONE SENATOR, ONE MAP: THE CASE
FOR TRUNCATION
Adopting a complete truncation model like Florida's is the option most
consistent with constitutional principles and the priorities of the people of
California. As a matter of law, Reinecke's analysis of the equal protection
argument against deferral is flawed on multiple levels, including the nature of
the harm and the appropriate level of scrutiny; these defects call the system's
constitutional legitimacy into question. As a matter of policy, a truncation
system aligns much more closely with the good-government principles
endorsed by California's voters in the Voters First Act than does the Reinecke
system.
In Reinecke, the California Supreme Court mischaracterized deferral by
conflating two constitutionally distinct harms: dilution and disenfranchisement.4 1
The former is more familiar in the redistricting context, but deferral's two-year
total deprivation produces the latter harm. By framing deferral as a
"deviation[] from strict equality resulting from reapportionment coupled with
staggered terms," akin to "permissible deviations from strict population
equality among districts" in the vote-dilution context, 42 the court elided the
distinction and hid the true costs of deferral.4 1
38. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 2, subsec. a; 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/29C-15 (2011).
39. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 3, art. XIII, § 6; see also Moore v. McCuen, 876 S.W.2d 237
(Ark. 1994)-
40. See IOWA CONST. art. III, § 35; In re Legislative Districting of Gen. Assembly, 193 N.W.2d
784, 791 (Iowa), supplemented by 196 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa), amended by 199 N.W.2d 614
(Iowa 1972).
41. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6.
42. Id. at 12.
43. Adding insult to injury, the court's choice of analogies trivialized the harm to deferred
voters. Reinecke argued that deferral "results in even less temporary disenfranchisement than
the up to four-year disenfranchisement that may be imposed on residents who move into a
2019
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For the duration of their deferral, deferred voters are prohibited from
participating in the selection of the State Senate due solely to the state's
decision to place their residence in an even- rather than odd-numbered
district." Unlike in a dilution case, deferred voters do not have the value of
their vote partially reduced or debased-they are shut out altogether. Voting
for legislators is the primary way most citizens participate in our government."
Therefore, excluding some otherwise-qualified voters from that process, even if
only temporarily, fundamentally undermines the democratic legitimacy of
decisions made by the legislature and of California's system of government.46
Indeed, even the California Supreme Court has acknowledged, albeit in dicta,
that deferral means "partially disenfranchising substantial numbers of
'odd-numbered district' voters who otherwise would be entitled to vote for
senatorial offices." 47
The Reinecke court's misleading casting of the deferral harm, in turn, led to
the application of the standard of constitutional scrutiny appropriate to vote
dilution, rather than the stricter scrutiny appropriate to disenfranchisement.
The court claimed that the relevant equal protection test for electoral districting
is found in Mahan v. Howell, 4 which applied a relaxed, rational basis-style
senate district or who become of voting age shortly after an election has taken place." Id.
This analogy neglects the crucial constitutional difference that coming of age is never, and
moving is rarely, the result of state action, whereas redistricting-based deferral is
quintessential state action.
44. See James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility ofPolitical Community, 8o N.C.
L. REv. 1237, 1242-43 (2002) ("[R]edistricting inevitably creates a population of political
transients -people who, though they never physically relocate, are taken from one district
and placed in another to satisfy the demands not of community, but of population
equality.").
45. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) ("Most citizens can achieve this participation
only as qualified voters through the election of legislators to represent them.").
46. See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) ("Any unjustified
discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of
public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government."); cf id. at 627-28
("Legislation which delegates decision making to bodies elected by only a portion of those
eligible to vote for the legislature can cause unfair representation. Such legislation can
exclude a minority of voters from any voice in the decisions just as effectively as if the
decisions were made by legislators the minority had no voice in selecting.").
47. Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 559 (Cal. 1992). Recently, the California Supreme Court rejected
a challenge to the Commission's plan, in part because the proposed alternative would have
substantially increased the number of deferred voters. Vandermost v. Bowen, No. S198387,
2012 WL 246627, at *31 (Cal. Jan. 27, 2012). The court also suggested that "double-deferral"
arising from the use of an interim map in 2012 and a new map in 2014 might violate Section
2 of the Voting Rights Act because of its impact on minority voters. Id.
48. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
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analysis in identifying permissible bases for diverging from exact population
equality between districts.49 However, Mahan established a standard specific to
vote dilution in the context of state electoral districting, not for all possible
equal protection violations in the context of state electoral districting. The
California Supreme Court elided the distinction, stating without argument that
the standard applied in Mahan was "equally applicable" to the deferral
scenario.o
The different types of voting-rights claims conflated in Reinecke reflect
interrelated but distinct conceptions of voting, as identified by Professor
Pamela Karlan,s' which generate different kinds of constitutional responses.
Deferral affects the right to participation, "the formal ability of individuals to
enter into the electoral process by casting a ballot."s2 Participation claims, as
made in the white primary cases, de-annexation cases, poll tax cases, and
literacy test cases, are first-order limitations of who can and cannot access the
ballot and have been subjected by the Court to strict scrutiny.s Such claims
sound in norms of political equality and civic inclusion, touching on the basic
legitimacy of our democracy.s4 Vote dilution claims, on the other hand, are
about aggregation- "the choice among rules for tallying votes to determine
election winners"-and governance- "the ability to have one's policy
preferences enacted into law within the process of representative
decisionmaking."ss Aggregation and governance claims have traditionally
received less harsh scrutiny from the Court, because they are thought to be
outside the "core" right to participate. 6 Deferral, therefore, is a living fossil, an
49. Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1973) ("it is now settled that as it applies to state
electoral districting 'the proper equal protection test is not framed in terms of
"governmental necessity," but instead in terms of a claim that a State may "rationally
consider." (quoting Mahan, 410 U.S. at 326)).
50. Id. ("Although the Mahan case dealt with permissible deviations from strict population
equality among districts, its rationale appears equally applicable to deviations from strict
equality resulting from reapportionment coupled with staggered terms.").
51. Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705,
1707-o8 (1993).
52. Id. at 1708.
s3. Id. at 1709-11.
54. Id. at 1710-11.
55. Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v.
Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1345, 1350 (2001); see also Karlan, supra note 51, at 1717
("To my mind, Reynolds was ultimately a governance case.").
56. Karlan, supra note 51, at 1712 ("[O]nce these claims are excluded from the core right to
participate and the Court applies rational-relationship scrutiny, disenfranchising restrictions
survive challenge.").
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example of a species thought nearly extinct in our advanced democracy: a first-
order participation-based deprivation of the right to vote, implicating "intrinsic
political liberties."s"
The Supreme Court has never applied a universal level of scrutiny to all
burdens on participation in the franchise. While earlier cases suggested that
for direct barriers strict scrutiny applied," more recent decisions have balanced
the severity of the burden on the franchise against the importance of the
government interest served.6o In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,61
one of the most recent major voting rights decisions, six Justices across two
opinions of the split Court concluded that "severe" burdens on the franchise
must be justified by more than merely rational state interests, although they
advanced differently formulated inquiries. 62 Both opinions stated that the
preliminary inquiry was into the severity of the burden on voters and
concluded that because the law at issue (Indiana's requirement of photo
identification to vote) applied to all Indiana citizens equally and imposed a
burden that could be overcome with relatively little effort by a particular voter,
it was not a "severe" burden invoking strict scrutiny." Crawford therefore
57. See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REV. 28,
52 (2004) ("Thus, at least in mature democracies, cases concerning democratic processes
today do not often implicate what might be considered intrinsic political liberties (leaving
aside in the American context, perhaps, the few remaining access-to-the-ballot-box issues,
such as voter-registration or felon-disfranchisement laws).").
58. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right To Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 143 (2008); Joel A. Heller, Note, Fearing Fear Itself Photo Identification Laws, Fear of
Fraud, and the Fundamental Right To Vote, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1876-77 (2009); Demian A.
Ordway, Note, Disenfranchisment and the Constitution: Finding a Standard that Works,
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175 (2007).
59. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
6o. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
61. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
62. Id. at 191 (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion) ("In neither Norman nor Burdick did we identify
any litmus test for measuring the severity of a burden that a state law imposes on a political
party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of voters. However slight that burden may
appear, as Harper demonstrates, it must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests
'sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation."' (quoting Norman v. Cook Cnty. Officers
Electoral Bd., 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992))); id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("'[S]trict scrutiny is appropriate only if the burden is severe."' (alteration in
original) (quoting Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2oo5))).
63. Id. at 203 (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion) ("When we consider only the statute's broad
application to all Indiana voters we conclude that it 'imposes only a limited burden on
voters' rights."' (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 439)); id. at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("The universally applicable requirements of Indiana's voter-identification law
are eminently reasonable. The burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo
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suggests that for severe burdens applying only to some voters, significant
(rather than merely rational) state interests must be shown.
Because the Reinecke system wholly bars some voters from participating in
State Senate elections for an entire four-year cycle based solely on the state's
own actions in redistricting, the state would need to show a commensurately
strong interest to survive constitutional scrutiny under even the most relaxed
standard applied by the Court to laws concerning the right to vote. Given the
extreme skepticism with which the Court has historically treated unilateral
exclusions of some voters from participation based on characteristics unrelated
to voter qualifications,6 4 the state interest served by continued deferral, a policy
initially adopted through no deliberate choice of the legislature, would need to
be extremely strong. Even if the state interest attributed to deferral by the
Reinecke court-"the orderly operation of the four-year staggered terms
system" 6s-were sufficient to outweigh "dilution," it does not necessarily
outweigh the stronger countervailing interest of ensuring that every eligible
voter have an opportunity to participate in every election for her state senator.
However, even if the Reinecke court were correct in its characterization of
deferral as a form of vote dilution, the California system would not meet
Mahan's more relaxed scrutiny for two reasons. First, Mahan limits deviations
from population equality based on interests the state may "rationally
consider." 66 Even in the vote-dilution context, however, the location of a
voter's residence is not a permissible basis for distinguishing among voters. In
Gray v. Sanders, decided a decade prior to Reinecke, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that "there is no indication in the Constitution that homesite . .. affords a
permissible basis for distinguishing between qualified voters within the
State.",6 If residence was an insufficient basis for distinguishing among the
weights of votes in Gray, an early vote dilution case, surely residence is also an
insufficient basis for depriving citizens of the right to vote. Second, even if the
state interest attributed to deferral by the Reinecke court-"the orderly
identification is simply not severe, because it does not 'even represent a significant increase
over the usual burdens of voting."' (citation omitted)).
64. E.g. Harper, 383 U.S. at 670; see Crawford, 553 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J.) (plurality opinion)
("Thus, under the standard applied in Harper, even rational restrictions on the right to vote
are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications."); see also Karlan, supra note 51, at
1711 (arguing that "[t]he Court's decision to employ strict scrutiny in assessing participation
claims" means that "in cases that the Court puts within the participation rubric, the
application of strict scrutiny has resulted in universal invalidation of the challenged
restrictions").
65. Legislature v. Reinecke, 516 P.2d 6, 12 (Cal. 1973).
66. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 326 (1973).
67. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963).
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operation of the four year staggered terms system",68 -could be rationally
considered, Mahan held that less-than-perfect equality of voting weight is
constitutionally acceptable only when the state had not "sacrificed substantial
equality to justifiable deviations." 69 Reinecke, however, creates precisely the
situation Mahan explicitly forbids: by disenfranchising some voters and,
separately, double-enfranchising others, California has sacrificed substantial
equality.
The Reinecke system also creates a separate harm, one that has not been
addressed in litigation about staggering systems, based on the dilutive effects
of acceleration on other voters. In Reynolds, the Court wrote that
it is inconceivable that a state law to the effect that, in counting votes
for legislators, the votes of citizens in one part of the State would be
multiplied by two, five, or io, while the votes of persons in another area
would be counted only at face value, could be constitutionally
sustainable. 7o
Within the State Senate, the votes of accelerated voters are effectively
multiplied by two, as Reynolds forbids. While some variation from exact
population equality in districting has been allowed for state legislatures,7' even
the most lenient of the "one person, one vote" cases cannot support a system
that for accelerated voters amounts to "one person, two votes." Acceleration,
therefore, generates a separate harm from deferral, one suffered by all
non-accelerated voters.72
Both before and since Reinecke, other courts have found no federal
constitutional violation in deferral.7 ' These cases mirror the errors of Reinecke's
68. Reinecke, 516 P.2d at 12.
69. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 329.
70. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
71. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
72. Note that vote multiplication might also occur any time a voter moves between districts,
depending on the timing of elections in her old district relative to her new district. This
form of multiplication is less troubling because the role of state action is more attenuated
than in the acceleration context for most such moves (with the exception, perhaps, of
situations such as where the state requires a public employee to relocate). Nevertheless, the
fact that staggering systems generally create the possibility of such multiplication represents
a partial qualification to my argument.
73. E.g., Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 516 (3d Cit. 1993); Republican Party of Oregon v.
Keisling, 959 F.2d 144, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1992); Mader v. Crowell, 498 F. Supp. 226, 231
(M.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 647 P.2d 191, 198
(Colo. 1982). But see Fischer v. Grimes, No. 12-CI-109, slip. op. at io (Ky. Cit. Ct. Feb. 7,
2012), appeal docketed, Nos. 2012-SC-oooo91 & -000092 (Ky. Sup. Ct. 2012); supra note 28.
2024
121:2013 2012
ONE PERSON, NO VOTE
legal analysis: underplaying the harm,74 evaluating disenfranchisement as
dilution," and applying excessively relaxed scrutiny.76 However, even if these
courts correctly interpreted the letter of the law, they miss the broader
normative, democratic commitment to equal participation, rooted in
constitutional principles, that underlies the "one person, one vote" cases" and
other voting rights decisions.'5 This commitment should compel lawmakers to
act to protect voters where courts have not.
IV. WHAT IS LOST: THE CONTINUITY INTEREST
Choosing a system based on truncated terms would, of course, require
prioritizing among competing values. The California system of staggered terms
ensures institutional continuity, since at all times the State Senate has at least
some members who have not just been elected because the entire body never
stands for election at once. Truncating terms uproots the compromise between
continuity and responsiveness created by California's constitutional structuring
of its legislature, temporarily depriving voters of the stability created by never
having the entire legislature turn over in a single election. This harm is real and
should not be discounted.
Continuity becomes much less compelling, however, in the face of
inequality generated by deferral. One might argue that the fact that all voters
have a voice in the State Senate in the interim based on their ability to hold
nonresponsive senators accountable at the first post-redistricting election.
However, the normative democratic force of voting is not just about holding
elected officials in check by ex post disapproval, but is also indispensably about
equal participation in leader-choosing.So This power also does not remedy the
74. E.g., Mader, 498 F. Supp. at 231 (relying on the moving or coming-of-age analogy).
75. E.g., Keisling, 959 F.2d at 145.
76. E.g., Donatelli, 2 F. 3 d at 513-14 (applying rational basis scrutiny).
77. See, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
78. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
79. But note that the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the claim that elected officials have
a property or contract right to a particular office. See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7
(1944); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 577 (19oo); see also Reaves v. Jones, 515 S.W.2d
201, 204 (Ark. 1974) ("[Tjhe right to hold office is not a property right."); Letter from
Gregory A. Phillips to Sen. Cale Case & Rep. Peter S. Illoway, supra note 22.
8o. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) ("[E]ach and every citizen has an inalienable
right to full and effective participation in the political process[ ] . . . . [T]herefore, . . . each
citizen [must] have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state
legislature."); supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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inequality among voters generated by deferral: deferred voters have the
backward-looking ability to "vote the bums out," but all other voters have both
this retrospective power and the ability to prospectively choose their senators.
Continuity may be a desirable goal generally, but arguments for "continuity"
lose their normative force when the legislature being "continued" is not one
that was chosen by the entire electorate.
Moreover, the people of California, through constitutional amendment,
have repeatedly deprioritized continuity in the composition of the legislature
through anti-incumbent provisions. Most recently, the Voters First Act created
a districting system that formally forbade consideration of incumbent residence
or likely electoral impact." Forbidding incumbent-conscious districting may
produce fewer "safe seats" and lead to greater turnover (discontinuity) than
under the previous system of pro-incumbent gerrymanders." The Act sought
to ensure fairer representation and greater accountability, reflecting the sense
of California voters that legislature-drawn districts had illegitimately placed the
self-interested desires of legislators to perpetuate themselves in office above
representing and empowering voters." More broadly, California's strict
two-term limits, adopted through the Proposition 140 initiative in 1990, make
the informal continuity of long tenures, as opposed to the formal continuity of
a staggered-term system, impossible.* While anti-incumbent measures may
have a smaller impact on continuity than would truncation, these moves are
indicative of a high tolerance for discontinuity in search of better
representation on the part of California's voters and California's constitution.
Finally, the greatest harm to continuity is done not by truncation, but by
decennial redistricting itself. A system of governance that did not require
regularly redrawing the lines of electoral districts every ten years in order to
restore population equality would enjoy much greater continuity, but that is
not a system our Constitution, as interpreted in the "one person, one vote"
cases, allows. Those voters who, by no action of their own, are deferred, should
8i. CAL. CONST. art. XXI, S 2, subsec. e ("The place of residence of any incumbent or political
candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map. Districts shall not be drawn for
the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or
political party.").
82. Because there has not yet been an election under the new plan, we can only speculate about
turnover.
83. Proposition it (Cal. 2008), available at 2oo8 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. ui (West). Legislator-drawn
districts meant "[v]oters in many communities ha[d] no political voice" due to communities
being split up by redistricting to protect incumbent legislators; reform was meant to "ensure
fair representation" by putting "voters back in charge." Id. 5 2.
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not bear alone the costs of ensuring continuity when the Constitution compels
equality and therefore discontinuity through redistricting.
CONCLUSION
The principle of "one person, one vote" and the routine of equipopulational
decennial redistricting it spurred are deeply embedded in our democratic and
constitutional intuitions. Fifty years of case law and legislative action have, in
large part, made the Court's rhetorically powerful pronouncements realities,
but in many places, like California, pre-Reynolds government structures simply
never caught up to the post-Reynolds world. It is time for California, which
recently took bold strides forward for democracy and equality in the Voters
First Act, to catch up by following the model of states like Florida in adopting a
system that truncates legislators' terms in office following redistricting. For
California and states like it, state constitutional amendments may be required
to enact such a change. In so doing, California will be making a choice between
representation and continuity, but that choice is one that both the Constitution
and California's voters have already made.
MARGARET B. WESTON
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